Példa:Jövőkutatás:Online vita III.

Havas Attila havasatt@econ.core.hu

A typology of foresight programmes

Introduction

This presentation is based on a longer paper discussing the potential and actual role of foresight in policy-making, especially in the context of emerging economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). That paper summarises the theoretical framework, especially the process of innovation and economic theories; the implications for RTDI policies; and the link between foresight, innovation and RTDI policies. Then the rationale of conducting foresight is discussed: what policy challenges can be tackled by applying foresight? It is followed by a discussion of a new typology of foresight programmes, distinguishing the ones with an S&T, techno-economic or societal/ socio-economic focus. The concluding section summarises the major lessons, but also presents some policy and methodological dilemmas. This abridged version only presents the typology of foresight programmes.

Locating foresight programmes among future-oriented analyses

Decision-makers, experts and laymen in different historical periods and in different socio-economic systems shared at least one desire: to know their future in advance or even to influence it for their advantage. They used very different approaches and methods from spiritual/ religious ones to scientific investigations and various modes of planning. Without going into details here, it is worth recalling some of the major methods/ approaches in order to locate – and distinguish – foresight programmes:

• visionary thinking (in ancient times by prophets, more recently mainly by consultancy services or individuals [‘gurus’]); • forecasting (at different levels, using different methods, e.g. trend analysis, extrapolation); • futures studies (for academic purposes); • prospective analyses (for business or policy purposes, e.g. [technology] roadmapping, list of critical/ strategic/ key technologies); • strategy formation (at firm, sectoral, regional or national levels); • scenario planning (at a firm level); • indicative national planning; • central planning (at a national level); • foresight programmes.

Obviously, the above approaches have a number of common characteristics. All of them (a) deal with the future(s) in one way or another; (b) collect and analyse various pieces of information, and (c) can apply a wide range of methods, mainly scientific ones. Three key features can be used to differentiate the above approaches, and thus distinguish foresight programmes from other methods. These approaches can:

• be action-oriented vs. ‘contemplative’ (passive); • be participatory vs. non-participatory; • consider alternative futures vs. a single future state (already ‘set’ by external forces).

Action-oriented endeavours aim at shaping/ influencing/ acting upon the future, while passive ones are ‘contemplating’ about it (e.g. ‘pure’ futurologist studies, without any policy implications). In other words, the latter ones merely try to develop a better-informed anticipation of the future, e.g. for being better prepared by having more precise information.

Participatory future-oriented programmes/ projects meet all the three following criteria: they (i) involve participants from at least two different stakeholder groups (e.g. researchers and business people; experts and policy-makers; experts and laymen); (ii) disseminate their preliminary results (e.g. analyses, tentative conclusions and policy proposals) among interested ‘non-participants’, e.g. face-to-face at workshops, electronically via the internet with free access for everyone, or in the form of printed documents, leaflets, newsletters; and (iii) seek feedback from this wider circle (again, either face-to-face or in a written form). Conversely, if any of these criteria is not met, that activity cannot be regarded a participatory programme or project.

Finally, certain approaches are based on the assumption that the future is not pre-determined yet; and thus the future can evolve in different directions, to some extent depending on the actions of various players and decisions taken ‘today’. In other words, there is a certain degree of freedom in choosing among the alternative, feasible futures, and hence increasing the chance of arriving at the preferred (selected) future state. Clearly, there is a close link between being action-oriented and considering alternative futures. Other approaches, on the contrary, can only think of a single future, already ‘fixed’ by certain factors, and thus the task is to explore (forecast, predict) ‘the’ future scientifically. In sum, foresight programmes are action-oriented, participatory and consider alternative futures.

Focus of foresight programmes

Foresight programmes may have rather dissimilar foci, ranging from the identification of priorities in a strict S&T context to addressing broad societal/ socio-economic challenges. Georghiou [2001] and [2002] identified three ‘generations’ of prospective/ strategic technological analyses. This classification is used here as point of departure to develop a typology of foresight programmes to analyse their potential and actual role in policy-making. The first generation is the classical technological forecasting, aimed at predicting technological developments, based on extrapolation of perceptible trends. The main aim of a second-generation foresight programme is to improve competitiveness by strengthening academy-industry co-operation, correcting the so-called market failure and trying to extend the usually too short time horizon of businesses. A third-generation foresight programme tackles broad/er/ socio-economic challenges, and hence besides researchers and business people government officials and social stakeholders are also involved.

Three ‘ideal types’ of foresight programmes can be defined as major ‘reference points’. Identifying ‘ideal types’ is a long-established practice in social sciences (and somewhat similar to ‘models’ used in all fields of sciences): “The fact that none of these three ideal types (…) is usually to be found in historical cases in ‘pure’ form, is naturally not a valid objection to attempting their conceptual formulation is the sharpest possible form.” (Weber [1947])

Note, however, that all three ideal types of foresight programmes should meet the criteria defined above: they should be action-oriented, participatory and should consider alternative futures. The underlying difference among them is their focus:

• S&T issues: type A foresight programmes • techno-economic issues: type B foresight programmes • broad societal/ socio-economic issues: type C foresight programmes.

Their further characteristics, in terms of their aims, rationales and participants, are summarised in Table 1 below. One would notice immediately that these ideal types are not distinguished by their themes (topics): for example, they all deal with S&T issues, but by doing so, they pursue different aims, and follow different (policy) rationales. In other words, they address different challenges, ask different questions, use different approaches/ ways of thinking, and involve different participants. In other words, these ideal types should not be thought of as “Russian dolls”: the biggest one, type C incorporating the middle one, i.e. type B, and, in turn, type B encompassing the smallest one (the ‘core’), Type A.

Potential users usually constitute a broader group than the actual participants; they might include e.g. funding organisations, other policy implementation bodies and public service providers (including ‘quangos’ [quasi-NGOs]), professional associations representing the interests of their members (and thus involving them to some extent in strategy and policy formation processes in various ways), venture capitalists, trade unions, etc. Depending on the focus of a foresight programme (the types of challenges/ issues considered), as well as the political culture of a given country or region, some of these potential users and stakeholders might become participants, too. In any case, it is not possible to establish a one-to-one relationship between an ‘ideal type’ of foresight and its participants beyond the ‘typical’ participants indicated in Table 1. The type and number of participants, the methods, channels and for a used their ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dialogues, as well as the intensity, quality and impacts of these dialogues is obviously a question for the individual description, analysis or evaluation of actual foresight programmes.

Table 1.: Foci of foresight programmes

Table

Types A and B programmes have a longer tradition, and thus in general they are better known. Obvious examples are the Turkish Vision 2023 Project (type A) and the first UK Foresight Programme (Type B). (Tümer [2004] and Georghiou [1996], respectively)

Therefore, only type C programmes are explained here in some detail. The shift in focus is reflected in the structure, too: these programmes are organised along major societal/ socio-economic concerns (e.g. health, ageing population, crime prevention in the case of the Hungarian, the first Swedish or the second UK foresight programmes). A new element in the underlying rationale can also be discerned, the so-called systemic failure argument: the existing institutions (written and tacit codes of behaviour, rules and norms) and organisations are not sufficient to improve quality of life and enhance competitiveness, and thus new institutions should be ‘designed’ by intense communication and co-operation among the participants. In other words, the existing gaps should be bridged by new networks, appropriate policies aimed at correcting systemic failures, and establishing or strengthening relevant organisations. A foresight programme, based on this rationale, can deliver solutions in various forms: by strengthened, re-aligned networks as ‘process’ results of the programme, as well as by policy recommendations (‘products’).

An actual foresight programme is likely to combine certain elements from various types. In most cases, however, one type of rationale would be chosen as a principal one; it thus would underlie the more detailed objectives and structure of a programme, as well as the choice of its participants. Otherwise, it would likely to lead to an incoherent – even chaotic – exercise, characterised by tensions between (a) the various objectives, (b) elements of its structure, (c) the objectives and methods, (d) the participants and objectives, and/or (e) among the participants themselves. A certain level of tension, however, might be quite useful – or even essential – to produce creative, innovative ideas and solutions, of course, but too intense and too frequently occurring – structural, inherent – conflicts would most likely tear a foresight programme apart.

Coherence of foresight programmes

At a first glance, the focus of a foresight programme determines the themes to be discussed/ analysed to a large extent. For instance, as already alluded, typical themes for a technology forecast or a type A foresight programme would be specific fields of science and technology, such as microelectronics, communications, bioinformatics, energy technologies, new materials, bio- and nanotechnology. These topics have been dictated to a non-negligible extent by ‘fashion’ or fads, too: earlier much had been written on nuclear and space technologies, then came ICT to yield significance, and more recently the fields denoted by prefixes of ‘bio-’ and ‘nano-’ have taken the centre stage.

The time horizon can be driven by the dynamics of a given discipline or the imagination (agenda) of the futurists. For the latter, perhaps an extreme example is when Molitor [2000] predicts the weight and height of human beings in 3000. He has also published a book entitled The Next 1000 Years. It is not uncommon, however, to try to predict major events in a 50-100 years time horizon.

The so-called critical or key technologies method is also concerned with technological fields – as its name clearly indicates – but in this case the time horizon is much shorter, usually 5-10 years, as it is derived from policy-makers’ needs to set mid-term priorities. A typical type B foresight programme, e.g. the first UK one, deals with economic sectors, such as chemicals, construction, financial services, food and drinks, leisure and learning, retailing and distribution, transport, as well as technological fields, such as aerospace and defence, communications, IT and electronics, life sciences, materials. The time horizon in this case was 15-20 years, similar to a number of other national foresight programmes.

At a national level, only a handful of type C foresight programmes have been conducted so far. As already mentioned, these are concerned with broad societal/ socio-economic issues, such as human resources, health, ageing population, crime prevention, usually with a time horizon of 20-25 years. A premature conclusion from the above examples would suggest a mechanistic link between the focus and themes of a given foresight programme, as well as between themes and time horizons. A more detailed look, however, would reveal there is no strict one-to-one relationship in either case. E.g. information and communication technologies (ICTs) are usually analysed by all sorts of foresight programmes – with important differences, of course:

• in a critical (key) technologies programme the emphasis would be on specific technological terrains of this broad field, usually with a 3-5-year time horizon, and hardly any attention would be devoted to social issues (e.g. exclusion – inclusion of certain social groups; gaps between generations, or regions, cities and villages; e-democracy; regulations on, and incentives for, different types of content; etc.); • a type A foresight programme would also put the emphasis on – the usually assumed positive – technical aspects (including perhaps also the overall impacts on the society in general, i.e. not differentiated/ elaborated by social strata; but not considering the potential impact the other way around, that is, how socio-economic needs and trends would shape technological developments). These programmes opt, however, usually for a significantly longer time horizon (say, 20-25 years) than the one used in a critical (key) technologies programme. • a type B foresight programme is likely to focus on broader technological fields – as opposed to specific sub-fields analysed by the critical technologies approach. It would pay much more attention to the economic (market) aspects than the above ones, and perhaps would discuss some social factors, too, as they shape demand, but not much elaboration can be expected on social challenges (either dealing with the new ones caused/ accentuated by ICT or asking how ICT can contribute to tackle existing social challenges). The usual time horizon is around 10-15 years when this approach is chosen. • a distinctive feature of a type C foresight programme is the marked, deliberate shift towards precisely to those societal/ socio-economic aspects which are neglected by all the other approaches, and thus mentioned above as “negative examples”. Technical aspects, however, are not ignored by this approach, either, but discussed in a different context (also usually in a more integrated way, e.g. ICT and various types of media are understood as a complex, closely inter-related entity): other types of questions are asked, and new drivers and shapers come to the forefront. The time horizon, therefore, is also determined by the socio-economic issues identified by the programme: it would depend on the amount of time required to change the underlying settings, to influence the major shaping factors so as to achieve a certain (desirable) future state. (In other words, the time horizon cannot be shorter than the period of time needed for a change aspired by the programme.)

ICT has been used as an example here because it is – by definition – a technology, and as it is a significant one; thus, it is no surprise at all that various types of technology foresight programmes would deal with this issue. Non-technological topics – such as human resources, crime prevention, etc. – on the contrary, are only addressed by type C programmes as major issues. (This is not to be mistaken with the fact that some socio-economic factors might be included in a type B foresight programme as shapers influencing market dynamics – as mentioned above.)

Finally, it goes without saying that some inherent features of a given topic to be analysed also have repercussions on the time horizon. Usually changes take much more time e.g. in the field of agriculture (classical breeding), environment, education or in demographic trends than in rapidly evolving technologies, such as ICT or biotechnology. These determinants should not be ignored, and various themes/ topics of a given foresight programme, therefore, might have different time horizons.

In sum, although there is a great deal of overlap in terms of broad themes discussed by various types of foresight programmes, a closer look clearly shows that these apparently same topics are dealt with in rather different manners. A different focus means that different approaches are applied when analysing seemingly similar issues: a different set of questions are asked, and hence various – social, technological, economic, environmental and political – factors and values are taken into account to a different degree (some of these factors not at all in certain foresight programmes) by a different set of participants (technology experts, business people, researchers, policy-makers, lay people). The time horizon, in turn, is determined to some extent by the inherent (technical, social, etc.) features of the various themes, but also by the focus (main objectives) of the programme, in which these topics are taken up.

References

1. Cuhls, K. [2003]: From forecasting to foresight processes: New participative foresight activities in Germany, Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 22, No. 2-3, pp. 93-111. 2. Georghiou, L. [1996]: The UK Technology Foresight Programme, Futures, Vol. 28, pp. 359-377. 3. Georghiou, L. [2001]: Third Generation Foresight: Integrating the Socio-economic Dimension. In: Technology Foresight – the approach to and potential for New Technology Foresight, Conference proceedings, NISTEP Research Material 77 4. Georghiou, L. [2002]: Policy rationales, sponsors and objectives, presentation at the eFORESEE Workshop on Foresight Basics, Malta, 24-26 July 2002 5. Molitor, G. T. T. [2000]: Five Economic Activities Likely to Dominate the New Millennium: III Life Sciences Era, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 297-310. 6. Tümer, T. [2004]: Technology Foresight in Turkey: Vision 2023 Project, presentation at a UNIDO seminar on Technology Foresight for Organizers, 13-17 December, Gebze, Turkey 7. Weber, M. [1947]: Legitimate Authority and Bureaucracy, in: The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (translated and edited by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons), pp. 328-340, Free Press {reprinted in Pugh, D.S. (ed.) [1985]: Organization Theory: Selected readings, pp. 15-27, London: Penguin Group}